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David Velleman, in the introduction to his paper How we get along (2007), quotes Blackburn on 
a limitation of analytical moral philosophy.   He quotes from Ruling passions as follows: 
 
Amongst its many other infirmities, most analytical moral philosophy proceeds without 
ever clearly focusing on the social as a determining feature of individual action and 
motivation. (Ruling Passions, 1998). 
 
Now we can say that this limitation of analytical moral philosophy is in accordance with a 
general rule that a given position’s supposed strengths are generally much the same as its 
supposed weaknesses.  The characteristics which give a particular philosophical approach its 
identity, that which allows it to be effective, is some set of devices of limitation, of narrowing 
down.  These devices allow something to be said, a position to be taken.  This position is both 
an effect of the positing of the identity of a position, and the very positing of that position 
itself.  Thus there is an intertwining of the question of identity and of the narrowing down into a 
particular position, a sort of reciprocal intervention of each in the other. 
 
In this case, then, we can see with Velleman and Blackburn that to proceed in analytic fashion, 
in moral philosophy as elsewhere, is to focus on the particular, the dissolving or breaking-down 
of issues.  This is indeed the meaning of the Greek term analuein, and we can derive the history 
of this analytical approach back to the Peripetetics and the method outlined in the opening 
paragraphs of the Physics of Aristotle: 
 
  Now what is to us plain and obvious at first are rather confused masses, the elements 
and principles of which become known to us later by analysis.  Thus we must advance 
from generalities to particulars; for it is a whole that is best known to sense-perception, 
and a generality is a kind of whole, comprehending many things within it, like parts. 
(184a23-184b1)  
 
From this method we get modern day science and other powerful disciplines, such as those in 
the field of technology, and those human sciences which owe their provenance to the 19
th 
century desire to emulate the success of the natural sciences.  However, this strength on the 
part of analytic philosophical method tends, perforce, to discourage the question of the social.  
The discouragement is a subset, we could say, of its avoidance of all holistically-based 
questions, and also the avoidance of such phenomena (I avoid the term philosophy here) as 
existentialism, gestalt psychology, general systems theory, general economics, and other 
similarly-minded progeny of anti-analysis.  This avoidance often takes the form of a territoriality, 
a delineation of boundaries which helps to ensure (and insure) the identity of disciplines, to 
validate activities, to validate discourses, to define parameters and thus to allow, in the end, 
discussion. 
 
Insofar as the identity of the individual is essentially an analytical problem, a question not of the 
social, not of wholeness of a field but rather of the individuality of one of those parts into which 
the original sense-perception field is, for Aristotle, divided, we may consider that the question of 
the identity of the individual, particularly in respect of technology and new media, is not only 
one which lends itself effectively to an analytic approach (given the structural consonance 
between the particular and the individual), but that this question will only have become both 
possible and significant in the modern era, post-Aristotle and more particularly, post-Descartes.  
It is not the case that the consonance between an analytical approach and the problem of the 
individual is a coincidence.  The problem of the individual only arises in the context of a 
discourse which breaks wholes down into their parts in analytical fashion.  Thus a “problem” 
such as this arises within the context of the ongoing formation of the identity of a discourse as 
it works itself through (so to speak) in creating that very identity. 
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This is to posit in turn a feedback mechanism, a movement to-and-fro, operating through time, 
history and tradition, between philosophy, the possibilities it opens up, and the ways in which 
society “expresses” itself in politics, law, its institutions and indeed the technologies it uses.  
We could call this a reflexivity of discourse.  Discourse does not simply reflect the concrete 
manifestations of society and the individuals which make it up, although it does do this; it also 
makes that society and those individuals what they are in a reflexive movement and effect.  In 
other words, in considering the relationship between thought or discourse and the question of 
the individual in society, including questions of a moral nature, we must pay attention to the 
type of judgment we cast.  In Kantian terms, we must be careful which of the judgments of 
relation we select from his table of judgments in the first critique.  The logical function of 
hypothetical judgment relates to the categories of cause and effect; because of its linear nature, 
the simplicity of its concept and its position in the natural sciences, this type of judgment is 
most easily deployed.  It will not, however, be effective in disclosing the relationships between 
identity, society and the discourses in which these occur, for which purpose the logical function 
of disjunctive relation is surely more appropriate.  Disjunctive logic relates, Kant says, to the 
categories of community, ie that of reciprocity between agent and patient.  He also 
acknowledges that it is difficult to grasp, makes specific reference to this difficulty, and spends 
time explicating its significance: 
 
  In the case of the category of community, its accordance with the form of a disjunctive 
judgment… is not as evident as in the case of the other judgments.  To gain assurance 
that they do actually accord, we must observe that in all disjunctive judgments the 
sphere (that is, the multiplicity which is contained in any one judgment) is represented 
as a whole divided into parts, and that since no one of them can be contained under any 
other, they are thought as co-ordinated with, not subordinated to, each other, and so as 
determining each other, not in one direction only, as in a series, but reciprocally, as in 
an aggregate….  Now in a whole which is made up of things, a similar combination is 
being thought; for one thing is not subordinated, as effect, to another, as cause of its 
existence, but, simultaneously and reciprocally, is co-ordinated with it, as cause of the 
determination of the other….. This is a quite different kind of connection from that 
which is found in the mere relation of cause to effect (of ground to consequence), for in 
the latter relation the consequence does not in its turn reciprocally determine the 
ground, and therefore does not constitute with it a whole – thus the world, for instance, 
does not with its Creator serve to constitute a whole. 
 
 
Now, within any analytical philosophy which is part of this reciprocal movement of society and 
its discourse, the social does not, of course, disappear.   Is it a question, rather, of the logical  
order in which it does appear.   The analysis of society is generally and necessarily located after 
the positing and analysis of the individual and the particular.  Thus the importance and position 
of disciplines such as psychology, that is, disciplines which, on the basis of the particular, look 
at connections between those particulars.  For instance, David Shoemaker will state (in 
Reductionist Contractualism 2000), “I have very good reasons…. for cultivating… justifiability 
to all other selves with whom I am psychologically connected, given that they are, in a very real 
sense, extensions of me.”  Here, the self, the individual, comes first in the analysis, to be 
followed by the question of how this self becomes or is connected. 
 
By contrast, avowedly holistic and anti-Cartesian discourses such as existentialism (most 
notoriously, Heidegger’s starting-point of Dasein) will tend to avoid positing individuals prior to 
“the whole” (however this is characterised) and will therefore not include psychological issues 
within their ambit.  Of course, in each case, the starting point will be in some way overturned; 
Dasein retains an inevitably individualistic tone; Shoemaker states elsewhere by means of 
modus tollens (in The Irrelevance/incoherence of non-reductionism about personal identity 
2002) that “[i]t is not the case that questions of identity will always have determinate answers.  
Thus, we are not separately existing entities.” 
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On the basis of these initial thoughts, I wish to briefly suggest in outline what we might term a 
systems approach, or a reflexive approach, to the question of ethics, the production of identity 
and the question of the “self” in respect of information technology.  I wish to attempt to take 
seriously Kant’s thought that the hypothetical logic of cause and effect is related less to a 
scientific way of thinking about society than to the thought of the Divine mover, the archetypal 
cause, who is entirely separate from our intra-mundane world; and instead try to think his idea 
of a disjunctive logic, a logic of communality, of reciprocal and simultaneous coordination and 
determination of one thing with another in the context of a whole. 
 
This approach would then foreground the issue of the multiple feedbacks occurring between 
thought (in all its guises), the possibilities opened by it, technology, law and politics.  It is now 
doubt the case that digital computers and their associated databases, as particular phenomena, 
could only have been created, and are only established, improved and in themselves (in their 
true nature and identity) correctly understood by means of analytical research.  This is 
incontrovertible.  However, from this it does not necessarily follow that such an analytical 
approach will say all that there is to say about the societal ecology within which such 
analytically characterised machines must operate.  I use the term “ecology” here to echo again 
this idea of a systems approach, and to avoid here the idea of society as an object-like body or 
phenomenon the nature of which results from analysis.  
 
We cannot, in other words, rule out a non-analytic approach in respect of the encompassing 
“ecology”, even though a part of that ecology has been effectively roped off by analysis (and by 
“effectively” I mean both “in effect” and in a manner which is supremely effective).  To put it in 
Kantian terms, we could say that there is a general environment in which relations of reciprocity 
and community obtain; and, as subsets of this, there are specific niches were we have in effect 
acted as a Godhead, as a cause divorced from its effects, and allowed within that niche or 
subset a realm of cause and effect to rule. 
 
To wrench us elsewhere for a moment, this systems-approach to the ecology of databases has 
an eye to such post-Nietzschian thought as that of Deleuze (in Difference and Repetition) and 
Derrida (in Différance 1967), in the sense that both of these thinkers start from the idea and 
experience of difference from which any concept of identity or sameness will come to be 
derived.  All identity is for them constructed, in an ecological and hyper-mobile system of 
thought, law, politics and information technology. 
 
How, alongside (not contra) other approaches, might this inherently ambiguous mode of thought 
help clarify ethical issues?  We will give two examples. 
 
1 We note that questions of ethics and technology are inherently related to the specifics of 
individual countries and cultures.  It is not possible, generally, to posit universally valid moral 
laws or rules for action in relation to these issues, since they occur only within a more or less 
specific ecology within which they gain their meaning.  Currently, for instance, the UK 
government is proceeding with the development of a universal database of its residents, linked 
to an identity card supposedly guaranteed by biometric data (fingerprints, iris scans and so 
forth).  In a country with no tradition of identity cards - the very suggestion has only been 
possible in an atmosphere of “war on terror” - this endeavour has an ethical and political 
meaning entirely different to other European states.  The ecology and discourse within which 
this debate arises, and the resultant possibilities for the development and deployment of the 
technology, will therefore be most specific to the UK.  On the on hand, this provides an 
example of how politicians can, by manipulating terminology  - in this case, that of “war”, since 
the only precedent in the UK for identity cards was the second world war - achieve technical 
results.  On the other hand we know that the limitations of justificatory political UK-based 
discourse (in parliament and elsewhere) will in turn effect what it is possible to achieve in 
technical terms. 
2  Similarly, the project of a universal UK health-care database, accessible in principle at all 
health-service locations and potentially by hundreds of thousands of individuals (including non-
health-case professionals) is justified on broad technical grounds – that is, the more efficient 
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use of state healthcare funds and the better care of patients.  It is becoming increasingly clear 
that any digital database is per se vulnerable to inappropriate revelation.  An example of this is 
the recent loss of CD-ROMs with financial and identity details of 7 million children and their 
families from the UK tax authorities, data which could be used by criminals to commit 
fraudulent bank transactions.  Politicians claim incorrectly that this vulnerability is a purely 
technical question amenable to technical (that is, information technology security) solutions.  In 
other words, there is the promise that in an unspecified future it will be possible, in essence, to 
make these databases secure enough by means of a combination of managerial and computer-
related decision.   In fact, the question of data security of this type is an ecological, and thus 
properly political, question relating to the human-centred environment in which the data is used.  
It is such to the extent that we can posit an absolute rule of non-security; it is  per se not 
possible to protect against such security breaches by means of a technical solution.  That is, to 
generalize, it is not possible to apply a non-disjunctive logic to this problem.  It is not possible to 
pretend that the deployment of a computer database within society is amenable to the merely 
hypothetical logic of cause and effect.  It is not possible to claim that the relationship of society 
as a whole to these databases is the relationship of Godhead to its creation.  God remains 
unaffected by his creations – that is the concept of God, whether she exists or not; we, on the 
contrary, do not.  I am not arguing that this inherent non-security, these inherent security 
lapses, rule out the idea of a national healthcare database.  Rather it should be acknowledged in 
respect of health-care information, that the status of, say, the press, the privacy laws governing 
what it can reveal (and therefore how it can make its money) vary from state to state (compare 
the UK with France) and thus the ethical import of the necessary possibility of such security 
breaches will tend to vary according to the ecology within which it occurs.  Similarly in the 
interaction with other fields such as insurance. 
 
Taking one step further the theme of a feedback mechanism alternating to and fro between 
society, its discourses and the technological ecological niches being deployed within it, there is, 
I hypothesise, a structural - arguably ethical and political - law in respect of the issue of 
putatively private information storage in public-sector databases.  This law states that in order 
for the development of technologically-driven databases relating to citizens to proceed, the data 
collected must necessarily be or become “inoculated”, that is, made relatively innocuous 
compared to the data’s previous status in a particular society.  Since, as we have seen and 
contrary to the simplistic assurances of politicians, IT security is no defense against data 
release, there will inevitably be a tendency for the data to become or be made “worthless”.   
This will in effect be a structural, not-get-roundable defense to the release of information; 
security by the back door, if you like.  It is not that information will not be released, it is that 
the ethical import of this information will be toned down.  This movement is already inherent 
and effective in the project of transparency, freedom of information, secularisation and 
emancipation of western social structures.  For instance, it is only possible for a doctor’s 
surgery to ask a patient their religion and record it in their database (as happens in the UK) if 
this information is relatively innocuous and does not lead to, say, persecution or prejudice 
against the individual.  This goes in turn for all data.  In reciprocal fashion, the very asking of a 
question and its recording in a national database presupposes that this question is relatively 
innocuous.  In turn, the possibilities for release of the data into the public realm, for the 
purposes of blackmail, journalistic sensation, shaming or suchlike, and the inevitability of such 
release, will effect how relatively innocuous this data is by means of a ratchet moving in the 
direction of a reduction of prejudice and persecution of the individual.  Thus we can say that an 
effect of the recording information in the name of technological efficiency has the inevitable 
effect of also emancipating the individual in relation to that information. 
 
To conclude, what might be, then, the possible consequences of this “law” of inoculation or 
innocuation for politics, ethics and the status of the individual? 
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